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Comments on Proposed Amendments to the
Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings
Arthur D. Hellman
Abstract
In late 2017, prominent Ninth Circuit Judge Alex Kozinski was accused of engaging
in sexual harassment and other misconduct over a long period during his tenure as a
judge. Judge Kozinski resigned, but the controversy continued. The Director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, responding to a request from Chief
Justice Roberts, formed a Working Group to recommend measures “to ensure an
exemplary workplace for every judge and every court employee.” The Working Group
issued its report in June 2018.
In September 2018, the Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability (Conduct
Committee) of the Judicial Conference of the United States – the administrative policymaking body of the federal judiciary – issued a draft of proposed amendments to the rules
for handling complaints of misconduct or disability on the part of federal judges. Virtually
all of the substantive amendments in the draft implement recommendations of the
Working Group.
The Conduct Committee held a hearing on the proposed amendments in October
2018. I testified at the hearing and submitted this statement to accompany my oral
remarks. The statement is in five parts. Part I suggests some general principles to be
followed in drafting the Rules and Commentaries, with emphasis on the forward-looking
perspective Congress adopted in the 1980 Act. Part II discusses the definitions of
cognizable misconduct and disability contained in the new Article II. Part III addresses
issues of confidentiality and transparency raised by various amendments to Rules 23 and
24. Part IV comments on some of the other proposed amendments in the September
2018 draft.
Part V offers some additional suggestions for the Committee’s consideration,
including one specifically dealing with workplace conduct. The idea is that each circuit
would establish an interactive Web page or portal that would permit court employees to
file reports of possible workplace misconduct by a judge. The reports would be similar in
form and content to a complaint, but they would not be docketed as complaints. At the
same time, because the reports would go to the chief judge, there would be no
duplication of, or interference with, the procedures established by Congress for handling
formal complaints.
The article concludes by emphasizing that the 1980 Act created a “citizen complaint
procedure, and that the system should operate in a way that promotes confidence in the
judiciary among all citizens as well as “ensur[ing] an exemplary workplace.”
After the hearing, I submitted a supplementary statement elaborating on the Web
portal proposal and responding to comments by other witnesses. That supplementary
statement will be posted separately on SSRN.
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Statement of
Arthur D. Hellman
Judge Scirica and Members of the Committee on Judicial Conduct and Disability:
Thank you for inviting me to express my views at this hearing on the
September 2018 Draft of proposed amendments to the Rules for JudicialConduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings.1 I support most of the proposed
amendments, with some caveats and some suggestions for modification. I also call
attention to other aspects of the Rules that may be in need of revision, including
those defining the central and historic role of the circuit chief judge in assuring
adherence to ethical norms by all judges within the circuit. 2
Introduction
Many of the amendments in the Draft – including virtually all of the
substantive amendments – implement recommendations made by the Federal
Judiciary Workplace Conduct Working Group in its June 2018 Report. In that
report the Working Group also recommended that the Judiciary “consider
possible mechanisms for improving the transparency of [the process for considering
complaints under the 1980 Act].”3 I believe that a great deal more could be done
to “improve[e] the transparency of [the] process,” and much of this statement
will be devoted to suggestions for achieving that end.
The statement is in five parts. Part I suggests some general principles to be
followed in drafting the Rules and Commentaries, with emphasis on the forwardlooking perspective Congress adopted in the 1980 Act. Part II discusses the
definitions of cognizable misconduct and disability contained in the new Article II.
Part III addresses issues of confidentiality and transparency raised by various
amendments to Rules 23 and 24. Part IV comments on some of the other
proposed amendments in the September 2018 draft. Part V offers some
1

Judicial Conference of the United States, Guide to Judiciary Policy (Draft – 9.13.2018),
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/jcd_rules_redline_-_proposed_changes__9.13.18_0.pdf [hereinafter September 2018 Draft or Draft]. References in the text to page and
line numbers are to this draft. The hearing also examines proposed amendments to the Code of
Conduct for United States Judges. This statement addresses proposed amendments to the
Rules. I expect to submit a separate comment on the Code.
2

See infra Part V-A.

3

Report of the Federal Judiciary Workplace Conduct Working Group to the Judicial
Conference of the United States (June 1, 2018) at 31 [hereinafter Working Group Report].
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additional suggestions for the Committee’s consideration, including one
specifically dealing with workplace conduct. A brief Conclusion emphasizes that
the 1980 Act created a “citizen complaint procedure,”4 and that the system
should operate in a way that promotes confidence in the judiciary among all
citizens as well as “ensur[ing] an exemplary workplace.”5
First, a few words by way of personal background. I am a professor
emeritus at the University of Pittsburgh School of Law, where I was appointed in
2005 as the inaugural holder of the Sally Ann Semenko Endowed Chair. I have
been studying the operation of the federal courts for more than 40 years. My
writings include two articles of particular relevance to today’s hearing. One is an
overview of the regulation of federal judicial ethics.6 The other is an analysis of
the first set of nationally binding rules for judicial misconduct proceedings,
published shortly after the rules were adopted by the judiciary.7
In addition to my academic writing, I have participated in the development
and implementation of policy on various aspects of judicial ethics. In 2001-2002, I
worked with the House Judiciary Committee in drafting the bill that became the
Judicial Improvements Act of 2002 – the law that put the 1980 Act in its current
statutory form. In 2009, I testified at the hearing that preceded the impeachment
of District Judge Samuel B. Kent, and the House Judiciary Committee, in
recommending impeachment, relied heavily on my legal analysis.
Three of my hearing statements bear most directly on the subject of today’s
hearing. In September 2007, I testified at a hearing of this Committee on the first
public draft of the 2008 Rules.8 In April 2013, I testified at a hearing of the House
Judiciary Committee on “An Examination of the Judicial Conduct and Disability
System.” My written statement suggested some amendments to Title 28 of the

4

See infra note 26 and accompanying text.

5

Working Group Report, supra note 3, at 1 (footnote omitted).

6

Arthur D. Hellman, The Regulation of Judicial Ethics in the Federal System: A Peek Behind
Closed Doors, 69 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 189 (2007) [hereinafter Hellman, Judicial Ethics], available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1015858.
7

Arthur D. Hellman, When Judges Are Accused: An Initial Look at the New Federal Judicial
Misconduct Rules, 22 Notre Dame J. L. Ethics & Pub. Pol. 325 (2008) [hereinafter Hellman,
Misconduct Rules], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1116703.
8

Much of the substance of that statement can be found in Hellman, Misconduct Rules,
supra note 7.
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United States Code.9 The substance of several of those statutory proposals was
adopted through rulemaking in the amendments to the Rules promulgated by the
Judicial Conference in 2015. I also testified before this Committee in 2014 when
those amendments were pending.10
In my 2014 statement to this Committee, I traced the evolution of the
system now in place for handling complaints against judges, with particular focus
on the legislation, rules, and reports that preceded the adoption of the 2008
Rules.11 I will not repeat that account here, but will refer the interested reader to
the earlier statement.
I. Writing the Rules: General Principles
Before turning to the particular issues raised by the proposed amendments,
it will be useful to address some of the general principles that should guide this
Committee in writing the Rules.
At the 2007 hearing on the first public draft of the Rules adopted in 2008,
the then-Chair of this Committee, Judge Ralph K. Winter, posed a basic question:
For whom should the Rules be written? Should they be drafted primarily for use
by the judges who administer the complaint process, or should they written in a
way that would make them user-friendly for complainants and other members of
the public? I suggest that the answer, in essence, is “Both.” That answer has
important implications for the way in which the Rules are organized and drafted.
A. Identifying the Audience for the Rules
Judge Winter seemed to assume that identifying the primary audience for
the Rules is an “either-or” question. I do not think the matter need be viewed
that way.

9

The statement is available at the House Judiciary website and on my SSRN author page.
See Arthur D. Hellman, The Federal Judicial Conduct and Disability System: Unfinished Business
for Congress and for the Judiciary, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=24 35287
[hereinafter Hellman, Unfinished Business].
10

The written statement is available on my SSRN author page. See Arthur D. Hellman,
Proposed Amendments to the Federal Judicial Misconduct Rules: Comments and Suggestions,
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2554596 [hereinafter Hellman, Proposed
Amendments (2014)].
11

See id. at 2-7.
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First, the needs of judges and the needs of members of the public are not all
that different. Both will benefit if the Rules provide lucid and easily
understandable descriptions of what it is that chief judges, circuit councils, and
other actors are required or permitted to do. Both will benefit if, as suggested
below, the Rules provide more context for, and background about, the system of
which the Rules are a part. Both will benefit if the Rules are organized in a way
that makes it easier to find the provisions applicable to particular situations.
Second, it would be short-sighted to assume that the Act will be
administered by a small group of judges who, after a short learning period, will be
expert in navigating the Rules’ many details and cross-references. Disqualifications
(not to mention rotations in circuit council membership) will enlarge the pool of
judges who will be carrying out Chapter 16 functions for the first and perhaps
only time. The Rules should make it as easy as possible for these users to
understand their responsibilities.
Third, there is yet another audience for the Rules – the judges who become
the subject of non-frivolous complaints. They have an interest in being given a
clear presentation of their rights and responsibilities as well as the procedures
they can expect.
Finally and perhaps most important, making the Rules user-friendly for
members of the public as well as for judges will help to demonstrate the
judiciary’s commitment to transparency – and at little if any cost.
B. Implications for Rules Drafting
If, as I believe, the Rules should be written for the public as well as for the
judges who administer the Act, this broader view of the audience has important
implications for the content and organization of the Rules.
1. Emphasizing the forward-looking perspective
The 1986 Illustrative Rules – prepared by three circuit chief judges,
including Chief Judge James R. Browning of the Ninth Circuit, one of the
architects of the 1980 Act – began with a statement of purpose:
The purpose of the complaint procedure is to improve the
administration of justice in the federal courts by taking action when
judges or magistrates have engaged in conduct that does not meet the
standards expected of federal judicial officers or are physically or
mentally unable to perform their duties. The law’s purpose is essentially
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forward-looking and not punitive. The emphasis is on correction of conditions
that interfere with the proper administration of justice in the courts.12
This paragraph was retained in the revision of the Illustrative Rules
published in 2000,13 but when the first set of binding Rules was adopted in 2008,
the paragraph disappeared. Instead, the Rules began with a definition of their
scope, followed by a commentary that contained a brief history of the genesis of
the Rules.14 The proposed amendments add a definition of “covered judge,”
currently contained in Rule 4, but they do not restore the paragraph from the
Illustrative Rules.
I suggest that the new Rules should begin with a statement of purpose
similar to the one in the Illustrative Rules. Moreover, the statement should
elaborate on the proposition that the purpose of the law “is essentially forwardlooking and not punitive.” The proposition warrants emphasis for at least three
reasons.
First, it is implicit in the language of the 1980 Act. In defining misconduct,
Congress in 1980 rejected various formulations that had been used by the
circuits and instead used language taken verbatim from 28 U.S.C. § 332, the
statute that defines the powers of circuit judicial councils.15 Section 332, as it
stood in 1980, authorized circuit councils to “make all necessary orders for the
effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts within its
circuit.”16 Misconduct is defined in § 351 as “conduct prejudicial to the effective
and expeditious administration of the business of the courts.” And in cases where

12

J. Browning, C. Seitz & C. Clark, Illustrative Rules Governing Complaints of Judicial
Misconduct and Disability 3 (Federal Judicial Center 1986) (emphasis added) [hereinafter 1986
Illustrative Rules].
13

For the 2000 version, see Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Illustrative
Rules Governing Complaints of Judicial Misconduct and Disability 2 (2000) [hereinafter 2000
Illustrative Rules].
14

Judicial Conference of the United States, Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability
Proceedings, 248 F.R.D. 674, 678-79 (2008) [hereinafter 2008 Rules].
15

Judge Browning, in an opinion issued in 1986 but not published until 2009, provided a
detailed account of the evolution of the statutory language. See In re Charge of Judicial
Misconduct, No. 83-8037 (9th Cir. Judicial Council Mar. 5, 1986), reprinted in In re Complaint
of Judicial Misconduct, 570 F.3d 1144, 1145-54 (9th Cir. Judicial Council 2009) [hereinafter
Browning Misconduct Order].
16

The 1980 Act amended this provision to refer to “the effective and expeditious
administration of justice within its circuit.”
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a special committee has been appointed to investigate a complaint, the remedial
powers of a judicial council are limited by § 354(a)(1)(C) to “such action as is
appropriate to assure the effective and expeditious administration of the business
of the courts within the circuit.” All of this language is forward-looking; none of it
supports any action by a judicial council purely to punish a judge.
Second, the forward-looking perspective was emphasized in both the House
and the Senate when Congress considered the legislation that became the 1980
Act. On the House floor, Rep. Carlos Moorhead, one of the sponsors of the bill,
noted that the legislation was designed to deal with “isolated cases that involve
judicial misconduct or disability, which do not rise to the level of an impeachable
offense, yet need redress.”17 He continued by quoting a set of standards
promulgated by the American Bar Association:
The major purpose of judicial discipline is not to punish judges, but
to protect the public, preserve the integrity of the judicial process,
maintain public confidence in the judiciary, and create a greater
awareness of proper judicial behavior on the part of judges themselves.
On the Senate side, Senator Dennis DeConcini – who had advocated a
stronger measure previously passed by the Senate – quoted the same paragraph
from the ABA standards. He too emphasized that the purpose of the legislation
was “to remedy matters relating to a judge’s condition or conduct which interfere
with his performance and responsibilities.”18
Third, the forward-looking perspective is particularly appropriate – perhaps
even essential – in dealing with complaints against Article III judges. There is a
wide consensus that the sole means of removing an Article III judge from office is
the impeachment process delineated in Articles I and II of the Constitution.19
Thus, if an Article III judge has engaged in misconduct that would not be a basis
for impeachment, and the judge does not resign from the bench, the judge will
continue to hear and decide cases. The misconduct system should provide
“redress” or “remedy,” but it should do so in a way that maximizes the likelihood
that the judge will be able to serve effectively during the remainder of his or her
tenure.
17

126 Cong. Rec. 25370 (remarks of Rep. Moorhead) (emphasis added).

18

126 Cong. Rec. 28091-02 (remarks of Sen. DeConcini) (emphasis added).

19

For brief discussion, see Arthur D. Hellman, Impeaching a Federal Judge: Some Lessons
from History, U. of Pittsburgh Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2014-37 at 13 (2014),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2500786
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That is not only my own view; it is the view that was repeatedly put
forward at the key hearings that preceded the passage of the 1980 Act. In
particular, Judge Browning recounted several examples of measures taken to
address judicial misconduct or disability during his 18 years as a member of the
Ninth Circuit Judicial Council. He told about an “alcoholic judge” who “took the
cure” and ultimately returned to the bench “under controlled conditions.” Judge
Browning noted that the way in which the matter was handled “mad[e] the judge
an effective judge again.”20 Summarizing another episode, Judge Browning
emphasized that the approach taken by the judicial council allowed the judge to
“continue[] to serve until his death, doing an excellent job.”
The point was made even more explicitly by Judge Browning’s colleague,
Judge J. Clifford Wallace. Judge Wallace told the House Judiciary Committee that
he had been assigned to investigate a misconduct complaint against a judge. In
doing so, he emphasized, his approach “was not just to find if the judge [was]
wrong.” He continued: “If there were wrong, I wanted to root it out. But more
importantly, I wanted to do it in the right way to save the judge.”21
That arresting phrase caught the attention of Rep. Tom Railsback, the
ranking member of the subcommittee (and later a sponsor of the legislation that
became the 1980 Act). He asked Judge Wallace about it. Judge Wallace stood his
ground. He explained:
That is true. I will correct the situation and save the judge, not just
correct the situation. If you are going out for both purposes, that
doesn’t necessarily indicate that you would be any less diligent in your
investigative work. But you have two responsibilities, and the second is
to the institution. If you can correct the situation, as well as improve the
institution, you are further ahead.22
In recalling their experiences for the House and Senate Judiciary
Committees, Judge Browning and Judge Wallace were conveying a clear message:
the procedures used by the Ninth Circuit to address allegations of misconduct or
disability had the effect of making it possible for judges, after intervention, to
become “effective judges” once again. The two judges were urging the
20

Judicial Tenure & Discipline – 1979-80: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil
Liberties & the Admin. Of Justice of the House Judiciary Comm., 96th Cong. 86 (1979)
(testimony of Chief Judge James R. Browning) [hereinafter House Hearing 1979].
21

House Hearing 1979, supra note 20, at 104 (emphasis added).

22

Id. at 105.
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Committee members to support legislation that would, in essence, codify the
approach that the Ninth Circuit had been taking. That is what the Committee
members did, and Congress adopted the bill that they sponsored.
That is not to say that Congress excluded remedies with a punitive element.
On the contrary, the legislation explicitly authorized circuit councils to issue
public and private reprimands for judges who have engaged in misconduct. But
reprimands are permissible because they serve the other purposes listed by the
ABA in the policy statement quoted on the House and Senate floor – they help
to “preserve the integrity of the judicial process, maintain public confidence in
the judiciary, and create a greater awareness of proper judicial behavior on the
part of judges themselves.”
I do not suggest that the Rules include a detailed account of this
background. But early in the document there should be at least a brief exposition
of the forward-looking perspective outlined in the Illustrative Rules. This can
most easily be done by preceding the text of the Rules with a Preface or
Introduction containing the statement of purpose and some explanation of the
general approach.
2. Reorganizing and restyling to make the Rules more user-friendly
As noted at the outset, the Federal Judiciary Workplace Conduct Working
Group recommended “that the Judiciary as a whole consider possible
mechanisms for improving the transparency of [the process for handling
complaints under the 1980 Act].” A good place to start is with the organization
and styling of the Rules that govern the process.
In their current form, the Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability
Proceedings are anything but user-friendly. Key concepts are buried within
lengthy multi-part Rules. Subdivisions within Rules deal with multiple subjects in a
single unbroken paragraph. (See, for example, Rule 5(a) and Rule 11(g)(3).)
Commentaries can extend over several single-spaced pages, without subdivisions
or internal headings. Cross-references sometimes resemble those in the Internal
Revenue Code.
I suggest that, in this or (if necessary) the next phase of its review, the
Committee should reorganize and restyle the Rules to make them easier to use
by judges, journalists, and citizens generally. At a minimum, lengthy multi-part
rules (including proposed Rule 4, Rule 11, and Rule 20) should be broken up, so
that key elements are defined in separate rules. This will also facilitate cross-
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references. Lengthy commentaries should be divided into sections, each with a
descriptive heading. (The Illustrative Rules offer a model.)
An example may be useful. The final sentence of current Rule 11(a) would
become something like: “After reviewing the complaint, the chief judge must
determine whether it should be (1) dismissed under Rule 12, (2) concluded under
Rule 13, or (3) referred to a special committee under Rule 14.” Separate rules –
each with its own commentary – would delineate the grounds for dismissing a
complaint and for concluding a proceeding.23
If the only purpose of reorganization were to make the Rules easier to use,
the effort would still be worthwhile, but breaking up lengthy Rules and
paragraphs can also serve a substantive purpose, by clarifying distinctions that are
now blurred. For example, not long ago, a judicial council released an order
dismissing a complaint on the basis of a “voluntary … apology” – although the
apology is specified in the Rules as a ground for concluding a proceeding.24 The
council might not have made that mistake if the two forms of disposition were
treated in separate Rules.
A reorganization could also highlight the distinction between a dismissal
under 28 U.S.C. § 352(b)(1)(A), which is analogous to a dismissal for failure to
state a claim on which relief can be granted, and a dismissal under §352(b)(1)(B),
which is analogous to the summary judgment that the commentary invokes.
Similarly, breaking up Rule 5(a) would clarify the distinction between the
chief judge’s duty to investigate a report of misconduct or disability and the chief
judge’s duty to identify a complaint. The standards are, and should be, different,
but lumping the two together in a single paragraph makes it easy for chief judges
to apply the wrong standard.25
Reorganization should be accompanied by restyling. In the Introduction to
the 1986 Illustrative Rules, Judge Browning and his colleagues emphasized that
“the basic statutory mechanism is a citizen complaint procedure,” and that the
Rules should serve the goal of providing “a reasonable response to citizens who
23

It may also be desirable to reorganize the provisions governing review of chief-judge final
orders (now Rules 18 and 19) to put them in closer proximity to the Rules defining the chief
judge’s authority to dismiss complaints or conclude proceedings.
24

See In re Charges of Judicial Misconduct, 769 F.3d 762, 769 (D.C. Cir. Judicial Council
2014) (Special Committee report). The decision correctly cited Rule 11(d)(2), which lists the
circumstances under which a chief judge (or circuit council) may conclude a proceeding.
25

For discussion, see infra Part V-A.
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invoke it.”26 This meant that “the complaint procedure [should] be available for
citizens to use” without the help of a lawyer. Judge Browning and his colleagues
therefore “made a special effort to avoid legal jargon in the rules.” This
Committee should adopt a similar approach.27
Judge Browning and his colleagues said that they did not seek to avoid legal
jargon in the commentary, because the commentary was “addressed primarily to
a legal audience.” In fact, the commentary that they wrote is quite readable.
Moreover, whatever may have been the case in 1986, today the misconduct
process receives attention from journalists and advocacy groups as well as
complainants. Thus the Commentaries as well as the Rules should be, in the
words of Judge Robert E. Keeton, “user-friendly” – “easy to read and understand
…., and as crisp and readable as clarity permits.”28
3. Explaining policy choices and changes
When Judge Browning and his colleagues published the first set of
Illustrative Rules, they noted that the commentary following each Rule was
included “to provide some explanation of the choices made by the committee
and the reasons for them.”29 In contrast, the current Rules rarely provide any
explanation of policy choices.
The drafters of the Illustrative Rules recognized that many of the Rules
implicate choices between competing values. The judges who administer the Act
will benefit if the Commentaries candidly lay out the considerations on both sides
and explain why the Committee made the choices it did. These explanations will
also contribute to the transparency that the Working Group called for.
Similarly, when the Rules are amended, the Commentaries should identify
substantive changes and explain why they were made. No one reading the
Commentaries in the current Rules (or those in the September 2018 draft)
would realize that there have been several changes in policy since the Rules were
26

1986 Illustrative Rules, supra note 12, at ix (emphasis added).

27

In contrast to the Rules for Judicial-Conduct and Judicial-Disability Proceedings, Enabling
Act Rules are intended primarily for use by judges and lawyers. Nevertheless, the Committee
can benefit from the guidance offered by Professor Bryan A. Garner, who served as the style
consultant to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference. See Bryan A. Garner, Guidelines for Drafting and Editing Court Rules (4th ed.
2004).
28

Id. at i (Preface by Judge Robert E. Keeton).

29

1986 Illustrative Rules, supra note 12, at viii (emphasis added).
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promulgated in 2008, or that those Rules reflected some changes from the
Illustrative Rules. Here too, greater transparency would better serve all of the
Rules’ constituencies.
II. Defining Cognizable Misconduct and Disability
The most important amendments in the September 2018 draft are those
dealing with the definitions of misconduct and disability. In this part of my
statement, I comment on the proposed changes and offer a few suggestions of my
own. The various matters are treated in the order in which they appear in the
draft Rule.
A. The Structure of Article II
In the current version of the Rules, cognizable “misconduct” and “disability”
are defined in Rule 3, a lengthy compilation that is primarily composed of
technical definitions. The September 2018 Draft reorganizes this material by
creating a new Article II containing only the definitions of misconduct and
disability.
That is a step forward, and I applaud the Committee for taking it. But it
does not go far enough, because all of the material is still contained in a single
lengthy Rule (now Rule 4). The preferable approach is to break up what is now
Rule 4 into eight or nine separate Rules, corresponding in large part to the
numbered paragraphs in Draft Rule 4(a) and the separate paragraph (b).
Reorganizing the material in this way would make it easier for members of
the public as well as chief judges to identify the particular provisions that may be
relevant to a particular complaint. Another benefit would be to break up the
lengthy Commentary, so that the Commentary’s discussion of each particular
issue would follow closely upon the Rule language dealing with that issue.
B. Relation to the Code of Conduct for United States Judges
The Commentary to the current version of the Rules includes a paragraph
delineating the relationship between the definition of cognizable misconduct
under the Act and the provisions of the Code of Conduct for United States
Judges. The September 2018 Draft eliminates much of that discussion.30

30

See Draft page 14, line 36 through page 25, line 9.
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For the reasons given by Russell Wheeler in his comments, I think the
Committee should retain the existing language and perhaps even expand it. As
Mr. Wheeler notes, there is much confusion among journalists and
commentators about the relationship between the Code and the misconduct
system, and the Committee should use the Commentary as an opportunity to
provide clarification. It is particularly important to emphasize that the Code’s
Canons are “informative,”31 not dispositive.
The Commentary could note that this approach finds support in the report
of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal, chaired by
former Congressman Robert W. Kastenmeier, the principal sponsor of the 1980
Act. The Commission recognized “the indeterminacy of the Act’s core
substantive conduct standard” and the need of chief judges and circuit councils
for “more concrete guidance.”32 Where was that guidance to come from? To
some extent, from the Code of Conduct for United States Judges. But the
Commission emphasized that “the Code was not intended as a source of disciplinary
rules, and not all of its provisions are appropriately regarded as enforceable under the
Act.”33 Rather, the Commission recommended, in essence, the approach of the
common law. Clarification could be “expected to emerge on a case by case basis
if dispositions under the Act are circulated and selectively published.” Later in
this statement I offer some suggestions for improving this process.34
C. Improper Ex Parte Communications
Current Rule 3(h)(1)(C) provides that cognizable misconduct includes
“having improper discussions with parties or counsel for one side in a case.” Draft
Rule 4(a)(1)(C) revises this language, so that it reads: “engaging in improper ex
parte communications …”
I support this change, which brings the language of the Rule in closer
conformity with the corresponding provision in the Code of Conduct for United
States Judges, Canon 3(a)(4).

31

Draft page 15, line 4.

32

Report of the National Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal, 152 F.R.D. 265,
344 (1993) [hereinafter National Commission Report].
33

Id. (emphasis added).

34

See infra Part III-B-3.
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In that connection, I note that, currently, there is no Commentary for this
particular provision of the Rules. It may be desirable to amend the Commentary
by adding material from the Code of Conduct to clarify the reference to
“improper ex parte communications.” In particular, the Commentary could call
attention to the Code’s exception for “communication for scheduling,
administrative, or emergency purposes” (and also to the limitations on that
exception).
D. Violation of Financial Disclosure Requirements
Draft Rule 4(a)(1)(G) states that cognizable misconduct includes “violating
requirements for financial disclosure.”35 In 2014, the Ninth Circuit Judicial
Council held that “violating financial disclosure requirements may be cognizable
misconduct [under the counterpart provision in the current Rules], but only if
the judge knowingly files false reports or repeatedly files erroneous reports, casting
doubt on the judge's good faith in making the disclosures.”36 Judge J. Clifford
Wallace – who as noted earlier was one of the architects of the 1980 Act –
concurred in the council order, observing that inquiry into a judge’s financial
disclosure report is permissible “when a complainant presents evidence of fraud
or bad faith.”37
I suggest that Draft Rule 4(a)(1)(G) should be modified to incorporate the
limitations outlined by Judge Wallace and the Ninth Circuit Judicial Council. The
simplest approach would be to insert “knowingly” before “violating.” The
Commentary could quote additional language from the Ninth Circuit Judicial
Council orders.
E. Harassment and Other Abusive Behavior
The current Rules provide that misconduct includes “treating litigants,
attorneys, or others in a demonstrably egregious and hostile manner.”38 The

35

Draft Page 13, line 1.

36

See In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 756 F.3d 1143-44 (9th Cir. Jud. Council 2014)
(Kozinski, C.J.) (emphasis added). The Ninth Circuit Judicial Council affirmed Chief Judge
Kozinski’s order of dismissal “[f]or the reasons stated by the Chief Judge and based upon the
controlling authority cited in support thereof.” In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, 778 F.3d
998, 999 (9th Cir. Jud. Council 2014).
37

778 F.3d at 999 (Wallace, J., concurring) (emphasis added).

38

The language is now contained in Rule 3(h)(1)(D).
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September 2018 Draft makes three changes to this provision. It adds “judicial
employees” to the class of persons who are to be protected from egregiously
hostile treatment by judges. And it specifies two particular kinds of abusive
behavior that fall within the realm of misconduct:
[1] engaging in unwanted, offensive, or abusive sexual conduct,
including sexual harassment or assault; [and]
[2] creating a hostile work environment for judicial employees.39
I support these changes, which codify what circuit chief judges and circuit
councils have long assumed. For example, in 1984, only three years after the Act
came into effect, five female court employees filed a complaint against a
bankruptcy judge in the Ninth Circuit alleging sexual and nonsexual harassment.
Chief Judge Browning appointed a special committee to investigate the
allegations. Based on the special committee report and other evidence, the Ninth
Circuit Judicial Council found that the allegations of sexual harassment were
“unproven,” but that the bankruptcy judge had “engaged in undignified and
inappropriate behavior by employing vulgar language and recounting off-color
stories to court employees.” This behavior “contributed to poor morale,
inefficiency and low productivity in the clerk’s office and constituted conduct
prejudicial to the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the
court.” The council directed the chief judge to administer a private reprimand. 40
Although the Council concluded that the allegations of sexual harassment
had not been proved, the Council assumed, without the need for citation or
discussion, that the allegations were within the scope of the Act. And when the
bankruptcy judge sought review of the sanction, the Judicial Conference
committee made clear that it shared that view.41
A decade later, the Judicial Council of the First Circuit found that a
magistrate judge had “engaged in conduct constituting serious sexual harassment
of [court] employees.”42 The magistrate judge was suspended for the remainder
39

The new language is included in Draft Rule 4(a)(2). See Draft page 13, lines 2-10.

40

In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, No. 82-8089 (9th Cir. Judicial Council May 2, 1984)
(on file with the author).
41

In re Complaint of Judicial Conduct, No. 84-372-001 at 7 (Jud. Conf. Comm. to Review
Circuit Council Conduct & Disability Orders Mar. 10, 1985) (on file with the author) (noting
that “there can be sexual harassment without touching”).
42

In re Complaint No. 140 (1st Cir. Judicial Council April 28, 1993) (report of Special
Committee) (on file with the author).
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of his term. Again, the Council assumed without the need for discussion that
sexual harassment constitutes cognizable misconduct under the Act.
Decisions like these leave no doubt that sexual harassment and similar
behavior has always been viewed as “conduct prejudicial to the effective and
expeditious administration of the business of the courts” and thus cognizable as
misconduct under the Act. It is helpful and desirable to make that explicit in the
Rules, and the September 2018 Draft does so.
F. “Discrimination” as Misconduct
Draft Rule 4(a)(3) provides that cognizable misconduct “includes
discrimination based on” race, sex, and several other characteristics or
conditions. Although this provision has no counterpart in the current Rules, in its
basic thrust it codifies what chief judges and circuit councils have long assumed.43
To that extent, codification is appropriate.
As currently drafted, however, the Rule is too broad. In my view, the
provision should be limited to conduct in the performance of official duties.
Discrimination outside the performance of official duties could still constitute
cognizable misconduct, but only under the circumstances delineated in Draft Rule
4(a)(7), the general Rule dealing with a judge’s personal life.
There are two reasons for adding this limitation. First, “discrimination” is a
broad, open-ended concept that can easily be interpreted to include verbal
conduct and other forms of expression. Two years ago, the American Bar
Association proposed a highly controversial professional conduct rule that would
subject lawyers to discipline for “discrimination” based on categories similar to
those listed in Draft Rule 4(a)(3). Even though the proposed rule is limited to
“discrimination … in conduct related to the practice of law,” critics have
expressed concern that that the rule “represents an unprecedented expansion of
the disciplinary committee’s jurisdiction over the private lives and speech of
attorneys.”44 Influenced by that and other criticisms, several states have already

43

See, e.g., In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, No. 00-80018 (9th Cir. Judicial Council
Sept. 11, 2000) (on file with the author) (publicly reprimanding judge for his practice of “writing
and exchanging in open court, notes that could reasonably be interpreted as reflecting bias”
against various groups).
44

Josh Blackman, Reply: A Pause for State Courts Considering Model Rule 8.4(g), 30
Georgetown J. Legal Ethics 241, 251 (2017).
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rejected the proposed rule.45 This Committee should be equally cautious about
adopting a rule that could intrude deeply into judges’ private lives.
Second, failure to distinguish between discrimination by judges in the
performance of official duties and discrimination in their private lives could
undermine one of the most fundamental messages that the judiciary seeks to
convey to the public: that judges, in carrying out their judicial responsibilities, can
put aside their personal feelings and affiliations.
This message has been articulated in a variety of contexts and forums,
including two in particular: Senate confirmation hearings and motions to recuse
based on a judge’s race, religion, or sexual orientation. At Senate confirmation
hearings, nominees to the federal bench are questioned about views they have
expressed in their personal and professional lives and about positions taken by
organizations with which they are, or have been, affiliated. The nominees respond
that they will decide cases based on the law irrespective of their personal
feelings.46 Motions to recuse argue that the judge cannot be impartial when one
party to a lawsuit is asserting a position that the judge would be predisposed to
favor or disfavor by reason of the judge’s race, religion, or sexual orientation.
The judges decline to recuse, emphasizing that they will decide the cases based
solely on the evidence and the law.47
I do not think these judges and nominees are denying that as individuals they
have, or might have, the beliefs and predilections attributed to them by virtue of
their writings and affiliations. Rather, they are saying that as judges they will not
be influenced by those beliefs and predilections.48 The premise must be that
judges can separate the beliefs and attitudes they hold by reason of their religious
45

See Scott Flaherty, More States Reject ABA Anti-Bias Ethics Rule, Am. Lawyer, Sept. 25,
2018, https://www.law.com/americanlawyer/2018/09/25/more-states-reject-aba-anti-bias-ethicsrule/
46

See, e.g., Responses of Lucy H. Koh to the Written Questions of Sen. Tom Coburn,
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/LucyKoh-QFRs.pdf
47

See, e.g., Commonwealth of Pa. v. Local Union 542 IUOE, 388 F. Supp. 155, 180 (E.D. Pa.
1974) (Higginbotham, J); State of Idaho v. Freeman, 478 F. Supp. 33, 37 (D. Idaho 1979)
(Callister, J.)..
48

Sometimes this point is made explicitly. See, e.g., [Responses of Amy Coney Barrett to]
Written Questions [from Senator Dick Durbin] (2017),
https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Barrett%20Responses%20to%20Durbin%20QFR
s.pdf (“I believe that every judge, like every person, possesses some ideological convictions, but
that no judge should allow those ideological convictions to dictate the outcome of a case.”).
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convictions or ethnic heritage or other private affiliations from the rulings they
make as judges. But if the misconduct system draws no distinction between
“discrimination” in the performance of official duties and discrimination in a
judge’s private life, it implies that the two realms are not separate – that the
beliefs and attitudes that are part of the judge’s private life will inevitably carry
over into the judicial realm. I do not think the Committee should go down that
road.
As it is, I suspect that many laypeople find it difficult to accept the
proposition that judges can put aside personal beliefs and feelings – particularly
those grounded in ethnicity, religion, or other personal affiliations – when they
decide cases. But the proposition is fundamental. By the same token, the
misconduct system should acknowledge that “discrimination” in a judge’s private
life does not necessarily equate to discrimination in the judicial role.49
Once again, I emphasize that I am not saying that “discrimination” in private
life can never constitute cognizable misconduct. I am saying that it should be
treated under the rule applicable to the general run of conduct outside the
performance of official duties. That subject is addressed in Part II-H below.
G. Failure to Report as Misconduct
The most significant addition to the catalogue of behavior that constitutes
cognizable misconduct is contained in proposed Rule 4(a)6). That provision, with
the heading “Failure to Report or Disclose,” states that cognizable misconduct
includes “failing to call to the attention of the relevant chief district judge and
chief circuit judge information reasonably likely to constitute judicial misconduct
or disability.”50
The proposed Rule – which has no counterpart in the current Rules – raises
several difficult issues. What kind of information should trigger the reporting
requirement? To whom should misconduct be disclosed? May a judge, when
informed by a third party about possible misconduct, make a promise of
confidentiality and, if so, what are the consequences of that promise? There is
also an organizational question: how much of the substance should be included in
the Rules and how much should be placed in the Code of Conduct for United
States Judges?
49

In this context, professional activities such as law school teaching and participation in bar
association committees would not be considered to be part of “private life.”
50

Draft page 13, lines 24-27.
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Preliminarily, the proposed Rule is awkwardly drafted; “information” cannot
“constitute” misconduct or disability. I think the Committee means something like:
“information that would reasonably lead to the conclusion that a judge likely has
engaged in misconduct or has a disability.” But before attempting a redrafting, I
address the substantive and policy issues raised by the proposal.
1. Defining the information that triggers the reporting requirement
Under what circumstances should a judge be required to report possible
misconduct by another judge?51 Three considerations are relevant: the nature of
the misconduct in question, the quality of the evidence available to the reporting
judge, and the level of confidence that there is cognizable misconduct to report.
First, the nature of the misconduct covered by the Rule. In my view, the
duty to report should be limited to instances of serious misconduct. That is the
standard applied in the reporting requirement that governs lawyers, and it is
equally appropriate here.52 There are costs in collegiality and human relations
when judges are required to report misconduct by fellow judges. Those costs
may be justified when the alleged misconduct is serious. It is much more difficult
to justify the costs when the alleged misconduct cannot be so characterized.
In another context, the Commentary recognizes that “an inadvertent, minor
violation of any one of these [specific] rules, promptly remedied when called to
the attention of the judge, might still be a violation but might not rise to the level
of misconduct under the Act.”53 By the same token, what appears to be an
inadvertent or minor instance of misconduct should not trigger the reporting
requirement proposed in the Draft.
The Commentary to the proposed requirement offers further guidance.
The Draft states that “the overarching goal” of the reporting requirement
“should be to prevent harm to those affected by the misconduct and to prevent

51

The reporting requirement in the Draft applies to both misconduct and disability. In this
section I shall concentrate on issues of misconduct. Somewhat different considerations may
apply to disability. Indeed, this Committee and the Committee on Codes of Conduct may wish
to consider separate treatment of disability issues in this context.
52

Under the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, lawyers are required to report “serious
professional misconduct related to honesty, trustworthiness, or fitness to practice.” See 2
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., et al., The Law of Lawyering § 68.02 at 68-7 (4th ed. 2018) (emphasis
added).
53

Draft page 15, lines 13-15.
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recurrence.” If the harm to be anticipated from the apparent misconduct is
insubstantial, reporting should not be required.
The draft Rule itself, in discussing the circumstances in which a promise of
confidentiality “may necessarily yield,” refers to “misconduct that is serious or
egregious and thus threatens the integrity and proper functioning of the
judiciary.”54 That standard, or something similar, should be incorporated into the
underlying reporting requirement.
Second, the quality of the evidence that triggers the duty to report. The
Rule itself is silent on that point, but the Commentary refers to “reliable evidence
of likely misconduct.”55 That is helpful, and something along those lines should be
included in the Rule itself. But in the context of defining misconduct for which a
judge can be sanctioned, it is not sufficient to refer in general terms to “reliable
evidence.” Judges should not be put in a position of having to speculate about
what kind of information a Circuit Council or the Conduct Committee might
later – with the benefit of hindsight – regard as “reliable.” The standard should be
an objective one. Specifically: the reporting requirement should generally be
limited to situations in which the judge has first-hand knowledge of behavior by
another judge.56
This view rests in part on a generalized distrust of hearsay. But there is also
a practical component. Suppose, for example, that Judge A’s law clerk tells Judge
B that she has seen Judge A engaging in what appeared to be unwanted touching
of a court employee. But did Judge A touch the employee? Was the touching
unwanted? The circuit chief judge could not investigate the allegation without
talking to Judge A’s law clerk. Judge A’s law clerk should thus be the person who
reports the allegation. And the rules, rather than requiring Judge B to report the
allegation, should facilitate direct communication by the law clerk to the circuit
chief judge. The judge’s role should be to encourage the law clerk to use the
direct channel.57

54

Draft Page 13, lines 32-36.

55

Draft page 16, lines 16-17 (emphasis added).

56

A lawyer’s duty to report misconduct by another lawyer is generally limited “to
wrongdoing known (rather than suspected) to have occurred.” Hazard, supra note 52, at 68-8
(emphasis added).
57

This approach may require establishing additional channels of communication. See infra
Part V-A.
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Third, the confidence level. The Draft Rule provides, in substance, that
judges must report actions or conditions “reasonably likely to constitute judicial
misconduct or disability.” Given that the Committee proposes to impose a
mandatory duty – the violation of which can result in sanctions – I am concerned
that this standard does not adequately protect judges who, mistakenly but in
good faith, fail to correctly interpret what they have seen or heard. I suggest,
therefore, that the duty to report should be imposed only when, based on firsthand knowledge, a judge has substantial grounds for believing that a covered
judge has engaged in serious misconduct or has a disability as defined by Rule
4(c).
2. To whom should misconduct be disclosed?
The Draft Rule provides that information about another judge’s misconduct
or disability must be “call[ed] to the attention of the relevant chief district judge
and chief circuit judge.” It is not clear that in every instance the reports should be
made to both the chief district judge and the chief circuit judge.
Under the 1980 Act, the circuit chief judge is the individual who is
responsible for screening complaints and reports of possible misconduct or
disability. But circuit chief judges – particularly in the initial phases of the inquiry
about a district judge, bankruptcy judge, or magistrate judge – frequently consult
the chief judge of the district in which the subject judge serves. Often it will make
sense for a judge who has information about possible misconduct or disability to
share that information with both chief judges. But if the judge thinks that in
particular circumstances one or the other is in a better position to undertake an
initial inquiry, it is hard to see why the judge should not be given the choice.
3. Promises of confidentiality
Undoubtedly influenced by the Report of the Working Group, the
September 2018 draft recognizes that a judge’s “information” about possible
misconduct by another judge will often come from a law clerk or other court
employee, and that that employee will insist on a promise of confidentiality.58
Two elements of Draft Rule 4(a)(6) deal with this situation:

58

For brevity, I shall refer hereafter to “law clerks,” but the discussion of confidentiality
applies equally to other individuals – inside or outside the court – who provide “information” to
one judge about another judge.
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 The judge “shall respect a request for confidentiality but shall disclose the
information to the chief district judge and chief circuit judge, who shall
also treat the information as confidential.”
 The “promise” of confidentiality “may necessarily yield when there is
information of misconduct that is serious or egregious and thus threatens
the integrity and proper functioning of the judiciary.”
I have two suggestions relating to these provisions. First, if the basic thrust
of Rule 4(a)(6) is retained, and the Committee decides not to insist on first-hand
knowledge, the Rules should make clear that the judge, at the start of the
conversation contemplated by the Rule, must inform the law clerk about the
limits of a “promise” of confidentiality.
Second, the prospect that judges will be making promises of confidentiality
that “may necessarily yield” to concerns about “the integrity and proper
functioning of the judiciary” raises further doubts about a rule that would require
judges to serve as conduits for information they receive from a third party.59 The
preferable approach is to take all possible steps to remove barriers to reporting
by the law clerk or other individual who has first-hand knowledge of the alleged
misconduct.60
4. Organizational considerations
It is evident from the discussion thus far that a Rule requiring judges to
report misconduct by other judges raises numerous difficult questions of policy
and implementation. I have no quarrel with the aspirational precept stated in
Canon 3B(5) of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges: “A judge should
take appropriate action upon learning of reliable evidence indicating the
likelihood that a judge’s conduct contravened this Code.” But it is one thing to
state the broad precept; it is quite another to apply that precept to the wide
variety of human interactions that are potentially implicated, Doubts are
heightened if the particulars are to be embodied in the Rules’ definition of
cognizable misconduct, and violation can subject a judge to sanctions.
If the subject is to be included in the Rules, the category should be defined
narrowly – something like: “Cognizable misconduct includes failing to
communicate with appropriate authorities when a judge has first-hand
59

“May necessarily yield” is a curious phrase. It seems to mean, in substance, that the judge
cannot really make a promise of confidentiality.
60

I will elaborate on that suggestion later in this statement. See infra Part V-A.
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information that gives substantial grounds for believing that a covered judge has
engaged in serious misconduct or has a disability that impairs the performance of
judicial duties.” The contours of the duty to report would be filled out in the
Code of Conduct. That is where judges expect to find particularized guidance
about the conduct that is required or prohibited by ethical norms.
That said, I think it is an open question whether the matter should be
addressed in the Rules at all. I am confident that the Committee does not want
to establish a system that could turn the Judicial Branch into a workplace of
informers.61 And it may not be necessary. The proposal in the Draft responds to
concerns about sexual harassment and other workplace misconduct. That
problem is best addressed by removing barriers to reporting by the individuals
directly affected. In Part V-A of this statement, I offer some concrete suggestions
to that end.
H. Conduct Outside the Performance of Official Duties
Current Rule 3(h)(2) provides that cognizable misconduct “is conduct
occurring outside the performance of official duties if the conduct might have a
prejudicial effect on the administration of the business of the courts, including a
substantial and widespread lowering of public confidence in the courts among
reasonable people.” The September 2018 Draft deletes the words “substantial
and widespread” from the Rule’s reference to the “lowering of public confidence
in the courts.”62 The Draft also deletes an entire paragraph from the
Commentary, including the statement that “judges are entitled to some leeway in
extra-official activities.”
In my view, the proposed changes are a step in the wrong direction, and I
urge the Committee to reconsider them. Judges are “entitled to some leeway in
extra-official activities,” and the Rules should carefully circumscribe the power of
circuit councils to investigate judges’ private lives. Three points deserve mention.
First, even the current Rule can be read as going beyond what the 1980 Act
authorizes. Under 28 U.S.C. § 351(a), a misconduct proceeding is commenced
when a complaint is filed “alleging that a judge has engaged in conduct prejudicial to
the effective and expeditious administration of the business of the courts.” Only
61

The Report of the Working Group not only sought to impose on judges an “obligation[]
to report … misconduct”; it also called for “training” in “bystander intervention.” Working
Group Report, supra note 3, at 31, 42.
62

The revised language is contained in Draft Rule 4(a)(7), page 14, lines 3-8.
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conduct that is prejudicial falls within the ambit of the Act. Conduct that “might
have a prejudicial effect on the administration of the business of the courts” – the
language of the current Rule – does not fall within the Act. It would be especially
anomalous to allow speculation about prejudicial effects to support a finding of
misconduct when the challenged conduct is entirely “outside the performance of
[the judge’s] official duties.”
Second, as noted earlier, Congress, in defining misconduct, made a
considered decision to borrow language from the statute defining the power of
circuit councils generally.63 The focus is on “the administration of the business of
the courts.”64 How does one get from conduct “outside the performance of
official duties” to “the administration of the business of the courts”? The Rules
make the connection by looking at the possible effect of the conduct on “public
confidence in the courts among reasonable people.”
This language evokes a standard that Congress, in considering precursor
bills to the 1980 Act, appears to have self-consciously rejected.65 Yet even if the
basic concept is accepted, the inquiry will necessarily be plastic and predictive. It
should therefore be closely cabined. The Rule should permit a finding of
misconduct only if non-judicial activity is likely to result in the specified lowering
of confidence. And it should retain the current requirement that the anticipated
lowering of confidence will be “substantial and widespread.”66
63

See supra part I-B-1.

64

Judge Browning, after a careful, detailed analysis of the evolution of the statutory
language, concluded: “Taken as a whole the legislative history of both chambers can be
harmonized only by interpreting the phrase ‘prejudicial to the effective and expeditious
administration of the business of the courts’ according to its plain meaning and requiring
complaints to allege conduct affecting the functioning of the courts.” Browning Misconduct Order,
supra note 15, 570 F.3d at 1154.
65

Early versions of the Senate bill defined misconduct to include, inter alia, “conduct
prejudicial to the administration of justice that brings the judicial office into disrepute.” E.g., S.
1423, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) (emphasis added). At a markup session in 1979, that
provision was dropped “because it was felt that this standard could be too intrusive on the
judge’s personal life and was subject to possible abuse.” 125 Cong. Rec. 30,050 (1979)
(statement of Sen. Thurmond). At a hearing the next year, the Department of Justice urged the
House Judiciary Committee to restore the “disrepute” language, but the Committee did not do
so. See Browning Misconduct Order, supra note 15, 570 F.3d at 1151-52.
66

The initial public draft of the 2008 Rules did not include the requirement that the
anticipated lowering of confidence must be “substantial and widespread” to justify a finding of
misconduct. That language, along with the substance of the current Commentary, was added in
the draft of Dec 13, 2007, after the comment period. It has been part of the Rules ever since.
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This approach finds support in the opinion by Chief District Judge James
Ware rejecting the claim that Judge Vaughn Walker, as a gay man who “had been
involved in a 10-year … committed same-sex relationship,” should have recused
himself from hearing a case challenging the California law denying same-sex
couples the right to marry.67 The argument for recusal relied, inter alia, on 28
U.S.C. § 455(a), which provides that a judge “shall disqualify himself in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.”68 Judge
Ware noted that the test under § 455 is “an objective one,” contemplating a
“reasonable observer.” Of particular relevance here, Judge Ware emphasized that
“a fact is not necessarily a basis for questioning a judge's impartiality merely
because that fact might lead a segment of the public to question the judge's
impartiality.”69 By the same token, the possibility that confidence in the courts
might be diminished among some reasonable people should not justify a finding of
misconduct based on extra-judicial activities.
Finally, expansive application of the misconduct statute to a judge’s private
life will make it even more difficult to persuade the public that judges can put
aside their personal feelings and attitudes when they decide cases. I have
discussed this point in connection with the provision on “discrimination” as
misconduct, and that analysis also applies to the general run of “conduct
occurring outside the performance of official duties.”70
To be sure, some extra-official activities “are certainly cognizable.”71 The
Breyer Committee gave as examples personal participation in fundraising for a
charity or attending a partisan political event. Beyond this, there is an excellent
analysis in a misconduct opinion by Chief Judge Dennis Jacobs of the Second
Circuit issued in late 2007. Judge Jacobs reviewed the relevant considerations;
probably the most important is “whether the [particular conduct] should be seen
as reflecting the Judge’s attitude toward law, or her understanding of ethical

67

Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 790 F.Supp.2d 1119 (N.D. Cal. 2011).

68

For discussion of § 455 and its relevance to misconduct proceedings, see infra Part IV-E.

69

790 F.Supp.2d at 1190 (emphasis added).

70

See supra Part II-F.

71

Judicial Conduct and Disability Act Study Committee, Implementation of the Judicial
Conduct and Disability Act of 1980: A Report to the Chief Justice, 239 F.R.D. 116, 241 (2006)
[hereinafter Breyer Committee Report]

October 25, 2018

Hellman – Judicial Conduct Rules 2018 – Page 25

boundaries.”72 Judge Jacobs also considered “whether the alleged conduct [was]
part of a ‘pattern of improper activity.’”
Concerns about an overly broad view of misconduct in a judge’s private life
carry particular weight in this era of polarized politics. Partisans and advocacy
groups can be expected to “weaponize” the misconduct process with the aim of
discrediting – or even driving from office – judges who they think are hostile to
their policy goals. That is another reason for limiting the category along the lines
suggested by Chief Judge Jacobs.
I. Exclusion of Pre-Appointment Conduct
The current Rules, substantively unchanged in the September 2018 draft,
specify two kinds of conduct that do not constitute cognizable misconduct:
allegations related to the merits of a decision or procedural ruling and allegations
about delay.73 I suggest adding a third exclusion: pre-appointment conduct by a
covered judge.
This question has arisen several times in the decades since the Act was
adopted, and the answer has always been the same: pre-appointment conduct is
not covered. The time has come to codify this exclusion.
The earliest decision on this point was written in 1986 by Chief Judge James
R. Browning of the Ninth Circuit. Judge Browning was one of the principal
architects of the system that Congress adopted in 1980, so his analysis carries
special weight. He began by carefully examining the evolution of the
“jurisdictional standard” in what is now 28 U.S.C. § 351(a). He then turned to the
principle of separation of powers. He concluded: “It would be incompatible with
this constitutional principle for the judiciary to review the determination of the
executive and legislative branches in the nomination and confirmation process by
investigating and possibly disciplining a judge for conduct occurring before
appointment to the bench.”74
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In re Charge of Judicial Misconduct, No. 06-9056-jm at 12 (2nd Cir. Judicial Council Dec.
14, 2007) (Jacobs, C.J.), http://www.ca2.uscourts.gov/Docs/CE/06-9056-jm.pdf.
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See Draft Rule 4(b), page 14, lines 9-25.

74

Browning Misconduct Opinion, supra note 15, 570 F.3d at 1155. Judge Browning’s
opinion was not published until 2009, when it was appended to a misconduct order issued by
Chief Judge Kozinski. See id. at 1144.
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In 2017, the Judicial Council of the Tenth Circuit reviewed decisions on this
point from seven circuits. It found that the decisions were consistent: “the Act
does not cover pre-appointment conduct.”75
Against this background, there is no reason to require further consideration
of the issue by chief judges or circuit councils.76 Article II should be amended to
make clear that conduct occurring before appointment to the federal bench is
ordinarily not cognizable under the Act.
I recognize that both the House and the Senate, through their actions in the
Porteous case, have determined that pre-appointment conduct can be a basis for
impeachment and removal from office.77 To that extent, pre-appointment
conduct could support judicial council action under 28 U.S.C. § 354(b) and
Judicial Conference action under § 455. That narrow exception could be
acknowledged in the Commentary.
III. Balancing Confidentiality and Transparency
When the House passed its version of the bill that became the 1980 Act,
the legislation included a strong provision on confidentiality. The Senate
amendments made some small modifications to the confidentiality rule and added
a new provision requiring that judicial council orders imposing sanctions must be
made public. Ever since then, circuit councils and this Committee have struggled
to balance the competing interests in confidentiality and transparency.
The September 2018 Draft makes modest changes in the rules on
confidentiality and disclosure. The amendments relating to confidentiality codify
current policy and should be adopted. The amendments relating to disclosure
move in the right direction, but some fine-tuning is in order.

75

In re Complaint under the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act, No. 10-16-90009 at 10-12
(10th Cir. Judicial Council July 28, 2017). Except for the Ninth Circuit decision discussed supra
note 74, none of the decisions were published.
76

The Breyer Committee believed that the question had not been “resolved conclusively.”
Breyer Committee Report, supra note 71, at 241. The Breyer Committee was not aware of
Judge Browning’s opinion, which had not been published at the time of its report.
77

One article of impeachment against Judge Porteous (Article II) expressly referenced his
conduct as a state-court judge; another (Article IV) relied on false statements about his past
during the nomination and confirmation process. See 156 Cong. Rec. 19133-39 (2010) (setting
forth Articles of Impeachment and Senate roll call votes).
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A. Confidentiality and Its Limits
The Working Group Report recommended that the Conduct Committee
“make clear … that confidentiality obligations should never be an obstacle to
reporting judicial misconduct or disability.”78 The September 2018 Draft
implements this recommendation by adding two provisions to Rule 23, the Rule
dealing with confidentiality.
First, the Draft Rule begins with a statement of purpose: “Confidentiality as
referenced in these Rules is directed toward protecting the fairness and
thoroughness of the process [under the Act and the Rules].”79 Only implicit is
the correlative: the purpose is not to protect judges from disclosure of
misconduct or disability.
Second, Draft Rule 23(c) specifically addresses the point raised by the
Working Group: “Nothing in these Rules and Commentary concerning the
confidentiality of the complaint process … prevents a judicial employee from
reporting or disclosing misconduct.”
Neither of the new provisions represents a change of policy. The current
Rule provides that “[t]he consideration of a complaint … is confidential.” That
language imposes no restraints on a judicial employee or anyone else who wishes
to report or disclose misconduct. Nevertheless, the Working Group Report
suggests that the import of the Rule may have been misunderstood. The
clarification is appropriate, and I support the proposed amendments.
One final point. Draft Rule 23(b) is composed of 10 numbered paragraphs,
several of which address more than one topic. No obvious ordering principle
governs the sequence of the various paragraphs, and several important provisions
are not flagged by paragraph headings. I urge the Committee to consider a
reorganization, perhaps creating a separate Article for the provisions on
confidentiality and disclosure.80
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Working Group Report, supra note 3, at 30-31.
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Draft page 54, lines 3-7. This is Draft Rule 23(a); The Commentary mistakenly attributes
this language to Draft Rule 23(c). See Draft page 58, lines 29-32.
80

For further discussion of reorganization, see infra Part III-B-3. Russell Wheeler, in his
statement, has suggested additional clarification and reorganization of the Rules relating to
disclosure. I agree with those suggestions.
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B. The Nature and Timing of Public Disclosure
Chapter 16 has little to say about the nature and timing of public disclosure
of misconduct proceedings, but the judiciary’s rules have filled in some of the
statutory gaps. The basic rule (part of Rule 24) is that orders entered by the chief
circuit judge and the judicial council must be made public, but only “[w]hen final
action on a complaint has been taken and it is no longer subject to review.” This
directive is supplemented by rules and commentary that address particular topics.
Three of these are the subject of amendments in the September 2018 draft:
interim disclosures, identification of the judge who is the subject of an order; and
the manner in which orders are made public.
Preliminarily, the September 2018 Draft amends the basic rule to specify
that orders should be made public upon the expiration of the deadline for
“review as of right.”81 Addition of the italicized language is a sensible change; there
is no reason to delay issuance of judicial council affirmances until the Conduct
Committee has determined whether to engage in discretionary review under
Rule 21(b)(2).
1. Interim disclosures
The rule prohibiting public release of chief-judge and judicial-council orders
until “final action on a complaint has been taken” is derived from the Illustrative
Rules. The commentary to those Rules explained that one purpose of the
restriction was to “avoid disclosure of the existence of pending proceedings.”82
That approach generally makes sense when the events underlying the complaint
remain unknown to the public. But when the underlying events have become the
subject of public reports, avoiding disclosure of the existence of the proceeding
serves no purpose other than to fuel public cynicism about judges “protecting
their own.”
In apparent response to this concern, the 2008 Rules took a cautious step
in the direction of allowing interim disclosures. The Judicial Conference added a
single new sentence at the end of Rule 23(a), the general rule on confidentiality:
“In extraordinary circumstances, a chief judge may disclose the existence of a
proceeding under these Rules when necessary to maintain public confidence in

81

Draft page 59, lines 1-2 (emphasis added).

82

2000 Illustrative Rules, supra note 13, at 55 (emphasis added).
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the federal judiciary’s ability to redress misconduct or disability.”83 When the
Rules were revised in 2015, two changes were made in this provision. The
reference to “extraordinary circumstances” was omitted. And disclosures were
permitted when “necessary or appropriate to maintain public confidence in the
federal judiciary’s ability to redress misconduct or disability.”84
The September 2018 Draft amends this provision – relocated to Rule
23(b)(1) – by authorizing disclosure by judicial councils and the Conduct
Committee as well as chief judges. In addition, a new paragraph in the
Commentary to Rule 23 authorizes “the disclosure of information about the
consideration of [a] complaint, including orders and other materials related to the
complaint proceeding,” but only when “a complainant or other person has publicly
released information regarding the existence of a complaint proceeding.”85
I fully agree that interim disclosures should, when appropriate, include
“orders and other materials related to the complaint proceeding.” But there are
two problems with the approach taken by the Draft.
The first problem is that the Commentary grounds this new authorization,
not in the renumbered Rule 23(b)(1), but in the separate paragraph – now Rule
23(b)(8) – that permits disclosure that “is justified by special circumstances and is
not prohibited by the Act.”86 That is unnecessarily confusing. If the Draft is
adopted, there would be two separate provisions – one in the Rule itself, one a
combination of Rule and Commentary – that address topics that are closely
related. Disclosure of the existence of a proceeding would be governed by
different standards from those for disclosure of the materials relating to that
proceeding. To add to the confusion, the second provision seems to reintroduce
the requirement of “extraordinary circumstances” that was jettisoned in the
2015 revisions.
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2008 Rules, 248 F.R.D. at 712. This provision was not included in the draft Rules that
were circulated for public comment in July 2007. It was added in the December 2007 draft.
84

For supportive commentary, see Hellman, Proposed Amendments (2014), supra note 10,

at 19.
85

Draft page 58, lines 1-7 (emphasis added). The Commentary says that the disclosure is
authorized “in the interest of assuring the public that the judiciary is acting effectively and
expeditiously in addressing the relevant complaint proceeding.” But as a textual matter that does
not seem to be a prerequisite to disclosure.
86

Draft page 55, lines 22-29 (emphasis added).
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The second problem is that the circumstances that, as a matter of policy,
will justify interim disclosures are not limited to situations where “a complainant
or other person has publicly released information regarding the existence of a
complaint proceeding.” That will often be the case, but the Rule should apply
more broadly to situations where allegations or reports of possible misconduct
have become public.
Both problems can be dealt with by adding a new subsection to Rule 23 that
would include all of the rules governing interim disclosures. It might read like this:
(d) Interim disclosures. When necessary or appropriate to maintain
public confidence in the federal judiciary’s ability to redress misconduct or
disability, a chief judge, a judicial council, or the Committee on Judicial
Conduct and Disability may disclose –
(1) the existence of a proceeding under these Rules;
(2) the identity of the subject judge; and
(3) orders and other materials related to the complaint
proceeding.
It may also be desirable for the Rule to specify particular interim actions
that should ordinarily be disclosed. For example:
 The chief judge identifies a complaint based on public allegations or
reports of misconduct.87
 The chief judge appoints a special committee to consider a complaint
involving allegations that are the subject of a public report.88
 A proceeding involving allegations that are the subject of a public report
has been transferred to another circuit under Rule 26.
I have used the term “public report,” and I think the term encapsulates a
concept that is relevant to several aspects of the Rules’ operation. For these
purposes, a report is “public” if it is published or posted in a print or electronic
source in a way that could reasonably be expected to influence public

87

Ninth Circuit Chief Judge Sidney Thomas followed that practice in the recent
controversy involving former Judge Alex Kozinski.
88

Chief Judge Anthony Scirica followed that practice in an earlier proceeding involving
then-Chief Chief Judge Kozinski. In contrast, in the Mark Fuller matter, the public learned of the
appointment of a special committee from comments to the media by the judge’s lawyer.
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perceptions of the regulation of ethics by the federal judiciary. Articles in
mainstream news media (national or local) and postings on widely read websites
would be “public reports” in this sense. Allegations on a website operated by an
individual with a grudge against a particular judge would not be. It would be useful
if the Commentary included some discussion along these lines.
The approach proposed here does no more than codify practices that have
already been followed by chief judges – and indeed by Chief Justice Roberts – in
some high-profile cases. Disclosure would remain discretionary, particularly with
respect to the release of materials. But the Commentary should make clear that
when allegations become the subject of a public report, some disclosure should
be the norm.
2. Identification of the subject judge
When final action has been taken on a complaint, the orders of the chief
judge and the circuit council must be made public. Should those orders identify
the judge who is the subject of the complaint? From the earliest days under the
1980 Act, the judiciary has struggled with that question. The current Rules,
largely tracking the 1986 and 2000 Illustrative Rules, divide dispositions into three
categories.
First, the rules specify three situations in which “the publicly available
materials must not disclose the name of the subject judge without his or her
consent”:
[1] “the complaint is finally dismissed … without the appointment of a
special committee;” or
[2] “the complaint [sic] … is concluded under [§ 352(b)(2)] because of
voluntary corrective action”; or
[3] “the complaint is finally disposed of by a privately communicated censure
or reprimand.”
Second, there is one (and only one) situation in which the judge’s name
must be disclosed: when the judicial council takes remedial action (other than
private censure or reprimand) after a special committee report.
Finally, the Rule specifies two situations in which the judicial council has
discretion to disclose or withhold the name of the subject judge: “if the complaint
is concluded because of intervening events, or [when it is] dismissed at any time
after a special committee is appointed.” The commentary notes one particular
circumstance in which disclosure of the judge’s name “may be in the public
interest”: when the judge “resigns in the course of an investigation.”
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The December 2018 Draft proposes small but significant changes in this
regime. In provisions [1] and [2] above – that is, if the complaint is dismissed
without the appointment of a special committee, or if the proceeding is
concluded because of voluntary corrective action – the words “must not
disclose” would be replaced with “generally should not disclose.”89 The revised
Commentary states that where a proceeding is concluded based on voluntary
corrective action, “the name of the subject judge generally should not be
disclosed, except where the complainant or another person has disclosed the
existence of a complaint proceeding to the public.”90
I agree that in the two situations referenced, there should not be an
absolute prohibition against identification of the subject judge in the final order of
the chief judge or circuit council. However, I believe that there is a better way of
drawing the line. The appropriate standard can be found in the concept of the
“public report,” discussed in the preceding section.
Consider first the cases in which the complaint is dismissed without the
appointment of a special committee. The Commentary to the current Rules has
little to say about the rationale for the non-disclosure rule, but a brief
explanation can be found in the commentary to the 1986 Illustrative Rules. That
commentary referred to “the legislative interest in protecting a judge … from
public airing of unfounded charges,” and said that “the [1980] law is reasonably
interpreted as permitting nondisclosure of the identity of a judicial officer who is
ultimately exonerated and also permitting delay in disclosure until the ultimate
outcome is known.”91
From a policy perspective, it is unnecessary to inquire into Congress’s
intent in 1980; the question, rather, is whether the asserted interest in protecting
judges from “public airing” should be given primacy over the interest in
accountability. In the routine cases that make up the vast bulk of complaints, I
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Draft page 59, lines 9-13.

90

Draft page 61, lines 11-16. The Commentary continues to state that if the complaint is
dismissed, “the name of the subject judge must not be disclosed.” I assume that this was
inadvertent, and that the explanatory language in the Commentary was intended to apply to
both [1] and [2]. In any event, I deal with the two situations separately in the text.
91

1986 Illustrative Rules, supra note 12, at 56 (emphasis added). See also 2000 Illustrative
Rules, supra note 13, at 55.
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think the tradeoff is a reasonable one, because neither interest is particularly
strong.92
The calculus changes when the underlying events have been the subject of
public reports. Suppose, for example, that a major local newspaper publishes a
story implying that a judge violated the Code of Conduct by endorsing a
candidate for elective office. A misconduct complaint is filed, but the chief judge
dismisses it, finding that the judge’s remarks did not constitute an endorsement.93
If the dismissal order does not identify the subject judge, that would not protect
the judge from the “public airing of unfounded charges;” on the contrary, it
would obscure from the public the information that he had been exonerated. In
this kind of situation, the policy of the current Rules is difficult to defend.
That was not always so. In 1986, and perhaps even in 2000, there was some
justification for assuming that newspaper reports of “unfounded charges” would
generally recede from the public’s memory, so that withholding the judge’s name
from the exoneration order would indeed help to protect the judge’s reputation.
Today, however, the reports will be available on the Internet and will be found
through Google and other searches long after their initial posting. The judge’s
reputation will be best protected by making sure that the exoneration order,
identifying the judge and explaining why the complaint was dismissed, will also be
available.
The “voluntary corrective action” cases present more difficult questions.
Typically, these are cases in which the accusation of misconduct has some
foundation, but the judge apologizes, and on that basis the chief judge concludes
the proceeding.94 One can argue that, at least where the chief judge finds that the
accused judge has violated the Code of Conduct or other ethical norms, the
public has a legitimate interest in knowing the identity of the judge. On the other
hand, if the apology (or other corrective action) did not carry with it a promise

92

For detailed discussion of this point, see Hellman, Misconduct Rules, supra note 7, at

357-59.
93

See In re Complaint of John Doe, JCP No. 06-013 (8th Cir. Jud. Council Oct. 18, 2006)
(Loken, C.J.) (on file with the author), discussed in Hellman, Unfinished Business, supra note 9,
at 9-10.
94

See, e.g., In the Matter of a Complaint Filed by ___, No. 11-17-90024 at 16-19 (11th Cir.
Judicial Council Mar. 22, 2018) (Carnes, C.J.) (at hearing, bankruptcy judge said to father of
debtor, “I think you are the lowest form of life for putting your son through this. You are a
despicable human being …”).
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that the order would not identify the judge, the judge might be less willing to
acknowledge fault and apologize.95 That does not seem like a desirable outcome.
Of course, this implicit bargain makes sense only when the allegations have
not received a “public airing.” If the underlying conduct has already been
reported in national or regional news media, it is hard to see what is gained by
withholding the judge’s name from the order.96 And including it allows the public
to see that the judiciary has not swept the matter under the rug. Indeed, in this
situation, chief judges today sometimes ask the apologizing judge to consent to
being identified in the order.97
In my view, the policy should be this: When the conduct giving rise to a
misconduct complaint has been the subject of a public report, there should be a
presumption that orders arising out of that complaint will disclose the identity of
the judge. The presumption would apply when the complaint is dismissed on the
merits and also when the proceeding is concluded based on corrective action. 98
The standard proposed in the Draft Commentary – allowing identification
of the judge when “the complainant or another person has disclosed the
existence of a complaint proceeding to the public” – is both under- and overinclusive. It does not encompass all cases in which there has been a “public airing”
of possible misconduct. And it may be read to include instances where the
disclosure would not reach or influence a general audience. The more general
concept of the “public report” delineated above is preferable.

95

Perhaps this is what the Rules commentary means when it says: “Shielding the name of
the subject judge in this circumstance should encourage informal disposition.”
96

Consider, for example, the 2016 proceeding involving District Judge Peter C. Economus.
Judge Economus wrote a letter to the editor of the local daily newspaper in which he endorsed
one candidate in a contested election for county prosecutor. This was a textbook violation of
the Code of Conduct. After a misconduct complaint was filed, Judge Economus wrote another
letter retracting the endorsement and apologizing for his wrongdoing. Chief Judge R. Guy Cole,
Jr., concluded the proceeding – which was certainly appropriate – but the order did not identify
Judge Economus. In Re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, No. 06-16-90007 (6th Cir. Jud. Council
Sept. 2, 2016).
97

See, e.g., In re Complaint Against District Judge Joe Billy McDade, No. 07-09-90083 (7th
Cir. Jud. Council Sept. 28, 2009) (Easterbrook, C.J.).
98

Public reports, in this context, can include appellate decisions. See, e.g., In the Matter of
a Judicial Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 351, No. 04-17-90033 (4th Cir. Judicial Council Aug. 7,
2017) (Gregory, C.J.) (concluding proceeding after district judge acknowledged inappropriate
behavior in a criminal case that was criticized in court of appeals decision).
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3. Manner of making orders public
What does it mean to say that orders must be “made public”? Over the
years, the Rules have taken successive steps toward greater transparency. The
September 2018 Draft makes three small additional changes. But more can be
done.
Under both sets of Illustrative Rules, orders were to be made public “by
placing them in a publicly accessible file in the office of the clerk of the court of
appeals” and by sending them to the Federal Judicial Center in Washington,
where they would be “available for public inspection.” The 2008 Rules provided
that final orders disposing of a complaint “must be made public by placing them in
a publicly accessible file in the office of the circuit clerk or by placing such orders
on the court’s public website.” The 2015 Rules replaced “or” with “and.” The
September 2018 draft reverses the sequence, so that Web posting is not only
required but has primacy. That is entirely appropriate.
Comprehensive posting has one drawback, however: orders of general
public interest (e.g. those that interpret the Code of Conduct or resolve a highvisibility complaint) are buried among the routine ones. The Commentary to the
September 2018 Draft, apparently in response to this concern, states: “Individual
circuits should seek ways to make decisions on complaints filed in their courts
more readily accessible to the public through searchable electronic indices.”99
That is a welcome step, but it is not adequate. I suggest four additional steps that
the Committee can take.
First, although indices would certainly be valuable (and I’ll discuss that topic
in a moment), it is more important to make it easy for journalists, scholars, and
members of the public to identify the small number of decisions that are of
general interest without having to sort through the huge number that are not.
There is a simple way to do this: the circuits should be required to post the nonroutine orders under a separate heading or on a separate page within the
website. That is the system used by most of the federal courts of appeals for
distinguishing between precedential and non-precedential opinions, and I think it
would work equally well in this context.
Second, the Committee should encourage chief judges and judicial councils
to designate non-routine orders as “for publication,” so that they would be
published in the Federal Reporter and available (and indexed) in legal databases
99

Draft page 61, lines 34-36. This sentence was taken verbatim from Working Group
Report, supra note 3, at 32.
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like Lexis and Westlaw. Several of the recent misconduct orders cited in this
statement – because they provide useful discussion of recurring issues – were not
designated as “for publication” and will not be found on line unless the
researcher knows where to look.
Third, the Rules should specify the criteria for designating orders as nonroutine. The designation is appropriate in at least three circumstances: if the
order has precedential value; if the complaint has been the subject of public
reports; and if the procedural posture departs from the routine. This third
category would include cases in which the chief judge identified a complaint, or a
special committee was appointed, or the chief judge concluded the proceeding
rather than dismissing the complaint.
Finally, it would not be a good use of resources for each circuit to devise
and maintain its own index for the handful of decisions that warrant indexing. The
index should be on the Federal Judiciary’s website, and the non-routine decisions
from all circuits should be posted or linked there. The decisions should be keyed
to the provisions of the Act and the Rules that they interpret and also to
provisions of the Code of Conduct for United States Judges that they construe
or apply. Selected orders from prior years should also be included.100
The decisions should also be indexed in a way that will allow users to find
cases involving particular kinds of alleged misconduct. The key variable is the
relation to the judicial role. At one end of the spectrum is conduct on the bench
or in judicial rulings. At the other end is off-the-bench conduct not involving the
judicial function. In between are, for example, comments to the media about
pending cases and conduct related to the judge’s role as employer.
Development of an indexed compendium along these lines would – at long
last – implement the recommendation of the National Commission on Judicial
Discipline and Removal that the judiciary develop “a body of interpretative
precedents” that would guide judges in administering the Act and also enhance
“judicial and public education about judicial discipline and judicial ethics.”101

100

One possible objection to a retrospective compilation is that some of the orders will
reflect decisions or practices that are inconsistent with the current Rules or the Conduct
Committee’s current views. The Committee could follow the example of the Breyer Committee
and provide commentary for particular decisions that would include a notation of any
divergences from current policy or practice.
101

National Commission Report, supra note 32, at 344.
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The September 2018 Draft makes one other change in Rule 24 that
deserves mention. Rule 24(a) is amended to require that orders identifying a
complaint or appointing a special committee must be made public when final
action has been taken on a complaint.102 There may be situations – particularly
when the complaint involves disability rather than misconduct – where this will
be unnecessary and even undesirable. The Rule should allow for some discretion.
This leads to a more general suggestion: that the Committee examine the
structure of Rule 24 and consider breaking it up into several Rules as part of a
new Article – perhaps one that also includes the provisions on confidentiality. As
the discussion of the revisions to Rule 23 makes clear, confidentiality and public
availability are important respects correlatives, and there is much to be said for
integrating them into a comprehensive whole.
IV. Other Changes in the September 2018 Draft
Apart from the amendments in (new) Article II defining cognizable
misconduct, the changes proposed by the September 2018 draft generally involve
clarification or emphasis more than substance. But [five] amendments to other
Rule provisions warrant discussion.
A. Institutional Analysis and Reform as Part of the Complaint Process
Current Rule 11(e) authorizes the chief judge to conclude a proceeding if
intervening events “make remedial action impossible.” The September 2018 draft
amends this provision by adding the words “as to the subject judge.”103 The
Commentary explains the thinking behind this change: although remedial action
may be precluded as to the subject judge, the judicial council of the circuit has
“ample authority to assess potential institutional issues related to the complaint.”
In particular, the council can analyze “what conditions may have enabled
misconduct or prevented its discovery and what precautionary or curative steps
could be undertaken to prevent its recurrence.”
I support this change, which is fully consistent with the forward-looking
perspective discussed in Part I of this statement. Indeed, the new language in the
Commentary echoes Judge Wallace’s remarks to the House Judiciary Committee

102

Draft page 59, line 7 (strikethrough).

103

Draft page 27, lines 7-10.
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40 years ago when he emphasized the use of the misconduct process to
“improve the institution.”104
The quoted language in the Commentary to Rule 11(e) is repeated in the
Commentary to Rule 20(b), dealing with the authority of the judicial council
following the appointment of a special committee. It may be desirable to include a
brief statement of this idea in the Preface to the Rules.105
B. Effect of Resignation or Retirement by Subject Judges
Section 351(d)(1) of Title 28 specifies the judges who are covered by the
Act: “the term ‘judge’ means a circuit judge, district judge, bankruptcy judge, or
magistrate judge.” Draft Rule 1(b) – currently Rule 4 – tracks the statute and
defines the “covered judge.” But what happens if a covered judge retires or
resigns after a complaint is filed?
The text of the Rules does not address this question, but the Commentary
to Rule 11 does.106 Currently, the Commentary states that the chief judge may
“conclude the proceeding” under § 352(b)(2) of the Act if the judge resigns from
judicial office, but that the complaint must be addressed as long as the subject
judge “performs judicial duties.” The September 2018 draft retains the first
provision but rewrites the second to say that the complaint must be addressed as
long as the subject judge “retains the judicial office.”
I support the new language, which applies to judges who retire from regular
active service under either 28 U.S.C. § 371(b) or § 372(a) but are not currently
performing judicial duties. As long as a judge “retains the judicial office,” he or
she may be called upon to perform judicial duties in the future, and the forwardlooking perspective suggests that allegations about misconduct or disability
should be addressed.
The Rules should also make clear that if the subject judge does resign from
judicial office, the chief judge must conclude the proceeding. To be sure, the
governing statute says “may,” not “must,” but for this particular “intervening
event,” there is no discretion to do otherwise. As the Second Circuit Judicial
Council has put it, when a judge “permanently and irrevocably” relinquishes his
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See supra text accompanying note 22.
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See supra Part I-B-1.

106

Draft page 32, lines 13 to 21.
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judicial office, he places himself “outside the parameters of the Act and
preclud[es] any action by the Judicial Council.”107
Finally, the Committee may wish to consider replacing the reference to “the
judicial office” with “judicial office as a covered judge.” This would eliminate any
ambiguity for situations where, for example, a district judge resigns from the
federal bench to serve as a justice on a state supreme court.
I also believe that these matters should be addressed in the text of the
Rules, not just in the Commentary.
C. Scope of Special Committee Investigations
Rule 13(a) now provides that a special committee “should determine the
appropriate extent and methods of its investigation in light of the allegations of
the complaint and preliminary inquiry.” The September 2018 draft adds a new
sentence: “In investigating the alleged misconduct or disability, the special
committee should take steps to determine the full scope of the potential
misconduct or disability, including whether a pattern of misconduct or a broader
disability exists.”108
This language codifies the approach that special committees have already
used in some high-visibility cases, including those involving former judges Mark
Fuller and Richard Cebull. The new provision is consistent with the forwardlooking perspective; to borrow Judge Wallace’s phrase, it may be possible to
“save [a] judge” who has engaged in an isolated instance of misconduct, but
probably not a judge who has repeatedly violated ethical norms. 109 I thus support
the amendment.
D. Encouraging Complainants to Protect Confidentiality
Rule 16 deals with the rights of the complainant in a special committee
investigation. Sections (a) through (d) give the special committee considerable
discretion in matters such as providing the complainant with a copy of the special
committee report and permitting the complainant to offer oral argument. Rule
16(e) provides that in exercising that discretion, “the special committee may take
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In re Complaint of Judicial Misconduct, No. 17-90118-jm at 3-4 (Feb. 5, 2018) (citing
authorities).
108

Draft page 35, lines 35-39 (emphasis added).
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See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
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into account the degree of the complainant’s cooperation in preserving the
confidentiality of the proceedings, including the identity of the subject judge.”
The September 2018 draft deletes Rule 16(e) in its entirety, along with the
corresponding paragraph in the Commentary.110 There is no explanation for the
deletion, so I can only speculate as to the Committee’s thinking. Perhaps the
Committee sees this as a corollary of other revisions emphasizing that
confidentiality rules are designed to protect the thoroughness and fairness of the
statutory process, not (implicitly) to prevent the disclosure of wrongdoing. If so, I
am not convinced that the change is desirable.
I am confident that the Committee does not intend to disparage the value
of confidentiality in the process. A large measure of confidentiality is required by
the statute. Even if it were not, studies such as those carried out for the National
Commission on Judicial Discipline and Removal make clear that chief judges and
circuit councils can often deal most effectively with misconduct (and particularly
with disability) if they can negotiate a resolution behind the scenes. Moreover,
confidentiality is often essential to securing complete and candid testimony from
witnesses.
In this light, it seems to me that special committees, in exercising their
discretion regarding the role of the complainant, should be able to take into
account the complainant’s cooperation in protecting the confidentiality of the
proceedings. I would retain the current provisions of the Rule and the
Commentary.
E. Disqualification of Judges from Chapter 16 Proceedings: the General Rule
Rule 25 deals with the disqualification of judges from participating in
misconduct or disability proceedings. The amendments adopted in 2015 altered
some of the specific provisions in the Rule,111 but they did not change the general
standard stated in Rule 25(a): “Any judge is disqualified from participating in any
proceeding under these Rules if the judge, in his or her discretion, concludes that
circumstances warrant disqualification.” (Emphasis added.) The September 2018
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draft now proposes to amend Rule 25(a) by deleting the words “in his or her
discretion.”112
There may be some utility in de-emphasizing the element of discretion, but
the proposed change would not cure what I view as the fundamental flaw in Rule
25(a), which is that the standard is completely subjective. Rule 25(a) contrasts
sharply with the standard that Congress enacted in 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) for
“litigation”: a judge “shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his
impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” The courts have held that § 455(a)
“adopts the objective standard of a reasonable observer” who is “fully informed of
the underlying facts.”113 In addition, § 455(b) specifies several particular
circumstances in which disqualification is required (e.g. financial interest) and
which are non-waivable.
Given the commands of § 455, it seems anomalous to say that a judge, when
deciding whether to participate in considering a misconduct complaint against a
fellow judge, should look only to his or her own sense of whether disqualification
is required. One would think that, if anything, the bar to participation would be
higher than it is in the context of litigation. This is so for two reasons. First, as
the Breyer Committee recognized, the Act’s system of self-regulation necessarily
raises concerns about “guild favoritism.”114 Judges should therefore be especially
vigilant to avoid the appearance of conflict. Second, a refusal to recuse in the
context of litigation is generally subject to appellate review, while a refusal to
recuse in a misconduct proceeding is generally not reviewable at all.
The weak disqualification standard of Rule 25(a) is especially anomalous in
light of the bright-line rule that applies when the Conduct Committee considers a
petition for review after action by the judicial council of the circuit. Rule 21(c)
(unchanged in the September 2018 draft) provides: “Any member of the Committee
from the same circuit as the subject judge is disqualified from considering or voting
on a petition for review related to that subject judge.” Thus, if the subject judge
sits in the Central District of California, a Conduct Committee member from
Alaska is disqualified even if the two judges barely know one another and have
met only at circuit judicial conferences.
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Perhaps this bright-line prophylactic rule can be justified by ease of
administration, but ultimately it must rest on a concern for the appearance of
impartiality in the administration of the Act. That concern should also be
reflected in the basic disqualification standard of Rule 25(a).
I do not think it is necessary to elevate the bar above that of § 455(a), but I
do believe that the standard of § 455(a) should be applied in misconduct
proceedings.115 That was also the view of Chief Judge Browning and his
colleagues when they circulated a draft of the first set of Illustrative Rules in
December 1985. The draft rule read:
A judge will disqualify himself or herself from participating in any
consideration of a complaint in the same circumstances in which
disqualification would be appropriate in any other matter under 28 U.S.C.
§ 455 or other ethical precepts. No waiver of any ground for
disqualification may be accepted.116
But when the final version of the 1986 Illustrative Rules was made public, this
provision had disappeared, without explanation. Nothing replaced it until the
adoption of the current provision, quoted above.117 For the reasons already
given, I believe that that provision should be replaced with language that
incorporates the standard of § 455(a), or perhaps (as in the 1985 draft) the
entirety of § 455.118
V. Other Suggestions for the Committee
Most of the substantive amendments in the September 2018 draft
implement recommendations of the Federal Judiciary Workplace Conduct
Working Group. In this section I suggest additional measures to address the
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Working Group’s concerns and offer a few other proposals for improving the
administration of the 1980 Act.
A. Strengthening the Role of the Circuit Chief Judge
In discussing proposed Rule 4(a)(6), “Failure to Report or Disclose,” I
suggested that when a judge receives information from a law clerk or other
employee about possible misconduct by another judge, the judge should
encourage the employee to report the allegations directly to the circuit chief
judge. This suggestion brings to the fore the role of the chief judge in assuring
adherence to ethical norms by all judges within the circuit.
The 1980 Act itself, in what is now 28 U.S.C. § 351(b), authorizes the circuit
chief judge “to identify a complaint for purposes of [Chapter 16] and thereby
dispense with filing of a written complaint.”119 Current Rule 5 and the
accompanying Commentary provide some guidance as to how that authority
should be exercised. Rule 5 also contemplates that the chief judge may conduct
an informal inquiry into possible misconduct or disability without identifying a
complaint under § 351(b). The Rule thus codifies what Rep. Robert W.
Kastenmeier – one of the architects of the 1980 Act – referred to as “the
historic functions of the chief judge to respond to problems that come to his or
her attention, a function that existed prior to the Act.”120
In this section I outline some steps that can be taken to strengthen the role
of the chief judge. First, Rule 5 should be amended to make clear that under
specified circumstances a chief judge must conduct an informal inquiry or must
identify a complaint. Second, the Committee should consider encouraging the
circuits to establish Web portals that would enable court employees to inform
the circuit chief judge about possible misconduct or disability without filing a
formal complaint. Finally, chief judges should make a visible and emphatic public
commitment to addressing legitimate complaints and protecting complainants
from reprisal.
1. Chief judge’s duty to investigate reports of misconduct or disability
Rule 5(a) now begins with this sentence: “When a chief judge has
information constituting reasonable grounds for inquiry into whether a covered
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judge has engaged in misconduct or has a disability, the chief judge may conduct
an inquiry, as he or she deems appropriate, into the accuracy of the information
even if no related complaint has been filed.”121 In my view, this language makes it
too easy for the chief judge to do nothing in the face of evidence pointing to
possible misconduct or disability.
It is important to emphasize that this first sentence of Rule 5(a) does not
deal with the statutory procedure of identifying a complaint and thereby initiating
the formal process under Chapter 16. The Commentary to the Rule explains
persuasively why a chief judge should be accorded some discretion at that stage:
“[t]he matter may be trivial and isolated, based on marginal evidence, or
otherwise highly unlikely to lead to a [finding of misconduct].”122
But that rationale does not apply at this antecedent stage. On the contrary,
in order to determine whether any of the specified circumstances exist, the chief
judge must conduct some sort of inquiry. (For example, the chief judge might
informally ask the district chief judge to look into the matter.) Thus, I would
replace the “may” in the opening sentence of the Rule with “must” or “should.” I
would also make clear that the inquiry should encompass not only “the accuracy
of the information,” but also whether that information could lead a reasonable
observer to think that misconduct might have occurred.123
This requirement would apply irrespective of whether the “information”
reaches the chief judge through private communications or from public reports.
Although informal inquiry can be a particularly valuable tool for addressing
concerns voiced by law clerks or other court employees about judges’
behavior,124 it can also serve a useful purpose when public reports signal a
possible problem. For example, in February 2014, local media reported that
District Judge Patricia Minaldi of the Western District of Louisiana was arrested
for driving while intoxicated. She pleaded guilty to first-offense DWI. Three years
later, after an embarrassing series of in-court interruptions and mistakes, Judge
Minaldi acknowledged an “alcohol problem.”125 The Fifth Circuit Judicial Council
121
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found “compelling and uncontroverted medical evidence” showing that Judge
Minaldi was permanently disabled, and she retired for disability under 28 U.S.C. §
372(a).126 If the chief judge of the Fifth Circuit had initiated an inquiry after the
DWI arrest, Judge Minaldi’s “alcohol problem” might have been caught much
sooner, and at least some of the disruption and embarrassment might have been
avoided.
2. Chief judge’s duty to identify a complaint based on public reports
In emphasizing the value of informal inquiry when the chief judge receives
information about possible misconduct or disability, I do not minimize the
importance of the statutory procedure of identifying a complaint. On the
contrary, I think that this element of Rule 5 should also be strengthened.
A large measure of discretion in exercising the statutory authority is
desirable when the chief judge receives information through private channels, but
the justifications discussed above carry much less weight when allegations or
reports of possible misconduct have become public. In that situation, the chief
judge should be required to identify a complaint and to announce that he or she
has done so.127 If there is substance to the allegations, the public will be
reassured that the judiciary is truly committed to policing misconduct in its ranks.
If the allegations are without merit, the process will help to remove the cloud
that would otherwise hang over the judge’s reputation.128
3. An alternate channel for reports about workplace conduct
The July 2018 Working Group Report recommended that “the Judiciary
should develop additional, less formal alternatives [to the procedures under the
1980 Act] for addressing inappropriate workplace behavior.”129 The Report
noted the “need for the Judiciary to develop multiple informal mechanisms that
can provide a broad range of advice, intervention, and support to employees.”130
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I agree with the idea of developing new mechanisms, separate from those
established by the 1980 Act, for providing advice and support to employees. But
when it comes to investigating and redressing misconduct by judges – whether in
the workplace or elsewhere – new channels should be integrated into the
procedures established by the 1980 Act and should respect “the historic
functions of the [circuit] chief judge to respond to problems.”
One way of doing this would be for each circuit to establish an interactive
Web page or portal that would permit court employees to file reports of
possible workplace misconduct by a judge. The reports would be similar in form
and content to a complaint, but they would not be docketed as complaints. At
the same time, because the reports would go to the chief judge, there would be
no duplication of, or interference with, the procedures established by the 1980
Act. Text on the portal page would educate employees about the operation of
the portal and the differences between it and the complaint procedure. For
example:
 If the matter can be resolved to the satisfaction of the reporting
employee, the subject judge, and the chief judge, no complaint will be
identified and no order will be issued under Rule 24.
 As Rule 5 now provides, if the chief judge finds clear and convincing
evidence of misconduct and no informal resolution has been reached, the
chief judge must identify a complaint and initiate a formal proceeding
under the Act.
 If a formal proceeding is initiated and relevant issues are reasonably in
dispute, the chief judge must appoint a special committee.
One question that will arise is whether reports can be submitted through
the portal anonymously. The Working Group Report notes the concerns of law
clerks in particular about the possibility of retaliation, embarrassment, or other
undesirable consequences.131 But it will be difficult for the circuit chief judge to
conduct any sort of inquiry without knowing who has made the report, at least
where the reporting employee is also the alleged victim. Nevertheless, it may be
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desirable to allow the option of an anonymous report, with a cautionary note to
the employee about the resulting limits on the chief judge’s inquiry.132
The chief judge may also be able to take steps without having full
information in a way that might not be possible if a formal complaint was filed.
For example, the chief judge may be able to address the issue generally at a
judges’ meeting.
The Committee might consider asking a few circuits to establish portals as
pilot projects.133 It may be that there is no need for an alternate channel;
employees may be willing to file complaints if they are assured of protection
against retaliation. That assurance should come from the circuit chief judge – a
point that warrants separate discussion.
4. “Leadership from the top”
In outlining measures for “ensuring an exemplary workplace” for court
employees, the Working Group emphasized that “leadership must come from
the very top of the organization.”134 This admonition is equally valid in the
broader context of misconduct and disability generally. I reiterate the point that I
made in my testimony at the House Judiciary Committee hearing in 2013: the
most important element in “assuring that justified complaints are brought to the
attention of the judiciary without fear of retaliation”135 is the visible, emphatic,
public commitment by the chief judge of the circuit to addressing legitimate
complaints and protecting complainants from any form of reprisal.
There are many forums in which this commitment can be communicated; a
good place to start is the circuit website. Currently, if you go to the “judicial
conduct and disability” page of most (perhaps all) circuit websites, you will find a
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series of sentences emphasizing, in different ways, that “complaints about judges’
decisions and complaints with no evidence to support them must be
dismissed.”136 That is an important point to make, but it should not stand alone.
The page should also feature a personal statement from the circuit chief judge
telling court employees – and everyone else – that if there is evidence of
misconduct or disability, the chief judge really wants to hear about it and will take
steps to address it, including protecting complainants against retaliation.137
B. The Mechanics of Filing a Complaint
Current Rule 6(e), unchanged in the September 2018 Draft, requires the
complaint to provide “the number of copies of the complaint required by local
rule.” Most of the circuits now require only one copy, but at least one, the
Eleventh Circuit, requires four.138
I assume that in the circuits where only one copy is required, the complaint
and other materials will be scanned to create an electronic document, and the
electronic document will be transmitted to the chief judge. There is no reason
why all circuits should not follow this procedure, and the national Rules should
be amended to provide that only one copy must be filed by the complainant.
Going one step further, I suggest that the Committee consider amending
the Rule to authorize electronic filing of complaints. Obviously, security concerns
would have to be satisfied, but if parties can file litigation documents
electronically, it is hard to see why complainants should not have that option
also.
If this were done, the complaint form would be made available on court
web sites not only as a PDF but as an interactive document that would allow
complainants to enter data and submit the form electronically.139
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C. Transfer to Another Circuit Council
Rule 26 (unchanged in the September 2018 Draft) authorizes chief judges
and circuit councils to request the Chief Justice to transfer a misconduct
proceeding “to the judicial council of another circuit.” This provision implements
a recommendation of the Breyer Committee. I have two suggestions for
amendments to the Rule and the Commentary.
First, the Rule authorizes a request for transfer only in “exceptional
circumstances.” This predicate makes sense if one considers (in the Breyer
Committee’s phrase) “the bulk of the iceberg” of complaints. But it may not be
quite as appropriate if one focuses on the much smaller universe of cases in
which a request would be a realistic possibility. To be sure, the Breyer
Committee stated that transfers “should not be a regular occurrence.”
Nevertheless, the Committee’s report seems to contemplate a somewhat
broader use of the device than the phrase “exceptional circumstances” suggests.
Moreover, the specific circumstances listed in the Commentary to the draft Rule
(e.g., “the issues are highly visible and a local disposition may weaken public
confidence in the process”) might not necessarily be viewed as “exceptional.”
I think the best approach is simply to omit the prefatory phrase. All that the
Rule needs to do is to authorize the procedure. Explanation of the circumstances
that might justify a request can be left to the Commentary. The Commentary
could note that transfers “should not be a regular occurrence.”
Second, over the last few years, chief judges have consistently followed the
practice of requesting a transfer when serious allegations have been raised about
a judge of the court of appeals. This makes sense; a majority of the members of
the circuit council will be colleagues of the subject judge. I think the time has
come to codify this practice. Either the Rule or the Commentary should provide
that when a non-frivolous complaint is filed against a court of appeals judge, or a
complaint is identified against a court of appeals judge, the chief judge should
request the Chief Justice to transfer the proceeding to another circuit.
D. Reporting on the Administration of the Act
Congress has required the Administrative Office of United States Courts
(A.O.) to include in its annual report a statistical summary of the number of
complaints filed under the Act and their disposition. The Breyer Committee
recommended refinements to that report, and the A.O. has complied. But the
report is still confined to numbers.
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I suggest that this Committee should supplement the statistical report with
a narrative report that includes discussion of particular noteworthy complaints
and their resolution. Models for such a report can be found in the annual reports
issued by some state boards and commissions. The Minnesota Board on Judicial
Standards provides “abridged versions” of cases to maintain confidentiality; the
California Commission on Judicial Performance gives a wealth of detail.
The report should be signed by the chair of the Conduct Committee. And it
should be posted as a separate document on the “Judicial Conduct and Disability”
page of the Federal Judiciary’s website. Taking these steps would not only
enhance public understanding of the Act’s administration; it would also show the
judiciary’s commitment to policing misconduct within its ranks.
Other, smaller steps could also help in this regard. For example, the Judicial
Conduct and Disability web page should list the members of the Conduct
Committee. Currently, there is no way for the public to know who serves on the
Committee. Even Committee orders do not necessarily identify all current
members.
Conclusion
The proposed amendments in the September 2018 Draft are designed
primarily to advance the goal stated by the Federal Judiciary Workplace Conduct
Working Group: “to ensure an exemplary workplace for every judge and every
court employee.”140 They do this effectively, although, as I have suggested, there
is room for improvement. But in considering amendments to the Rules, the
Committee should not lose sight of a point emphasized by the architects of the
misconduct system: the 1980 Act established “a citizen complaint procedure,”141
and one purpose is “to maintain public confidence in the judiciary.”142 That goal is
even more important in an era when social media and 24/7 news cycles foment
public distrust of all institutions, even the most independent and upright. To
counteract that phenomenon, the Rules should foster transparency,
thoroughness, and procedural regularity in all contexts, whether the allegations
involve workplace conduct or some other aspect of the “administration of the
business of the courts.” The suggestions in this statement are offered in that
spirit.
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